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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
[W]e have been all too willing, in our longing to conquer disease and
death, "to possess the end and yet not be responsible for the means,
to grasp the fruit while disavowing the tree, to escape being told the
cost, until someone else has paid it irrevocably."'
L Introduction
The first principle of the Nuremberg Code is that "[t]he voluntary consent of
the human subject i; absolutely essential."' The reader should be aware, however,
that if she is rushed to the hospital emergency room after a car crash with severe
brain trauma, a heart attack, or similar medical emergency, and if she is
unconscious or otherwise incapacitated, she may be entered into an experimental
research project, including a randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trial, without
her consent. This opportunity is brought to her compliments of the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS). These agencies have issued regulations that provide a waiver of
informed consent requirements for emergency research under certain conditions?
The regulations allow a waiver when the potential subject is in a life-threatening
situation, where consent of the subject or a surrogate cannot be obtained, and
available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory. Recognizing the vulnerability
of the unconscious patient in the emergency setting, the regulations attempt to
provide additional protections, such as public disclosure of the proposed research
and consultation with the community from which subjects may be drawn. But
should the waiver be allowed at all? And if so, are the present protections
sufficient to safeguard patient interests in light of early reports that suggest such
protections, particularly the community and public disclosure requirements, may
be ineffective?
The current waiver of informed consent for experimentation on human subjects
in the emergency setting is fraught with ambiguities and, at least in part, may be
unethical. Advancement of medical research in the critical-care environment is
a worthy goal, and for the most part, the waiver represents a justifiable exception
to the requirement of informed consent. In its present form, however, it is not
drawn sufficiently narrowly to assure respect for individual autonomy. Moreover,
it fails to provide clear guidelines to aid the researcher in complying with the
waiver's requirements.
1. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 39 (1993)
[hereinafter Katz, Human Experimentation] (quoting Edmond Cahn, Drug Experiments and the Public
Conscience, in DRUGS IN OUR SOCIETY 225, 260 (Paul Taladay ed., 1988)),
2. Permissible Medical Experiments, in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1949), reprinted in THE ETHICS OF
RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS; FACING THE 21sT CENTURY 431 (Harold Y. Vanderpool ed.,
1996) [hereinafter ETHICS OF RESEARCH].
3. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (1999) (FDA regulation); 61 Fed. Reg. 51,531 (1996) (DHHS waiver, to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46). The DHHS regulation adopts and is virtually identical to the FDA
regulation.
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This article analyzes the need for the waiver, the waiver's benefits, and the
criticisms and concerns it has generated, This article advocates greater protections
for potential subjects, including amending state laws governing durable powers
of attorney for health care to allow an agent to decide whether the principal
should participate in medical research, and amending the current federal waiver
provision to provide greater disclosure. It also calls for heightened protections for
potential research subjects. Finally, the article explores the need for a National
Human Research Board equipped to resolve the difficult ethical questions arising
from waivers of informed consent, as well as experimentation on human subjects
generally.
IL. Overview of the Waiver of Informed Consent for Emergency Research
A. The Regulations4
The Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Commissioner of Food
and Drugs proposed to amend the FDA's informed consent rules on September 21,
1995. After a comment period, the proposed rule became effective November 1,
1996V The rules provide that before conducting research under a waiver of
informed consent, the Internal Review Board (IRB) responsible for approving the
investigation, along with the concurrence of a physician unconnected to the IRB
or the research, must find and document that the research is necessary to
determine the safety and effectiveness of a particular intervention, that the human
subjects are in a life-threatening situation, that available treatments are unproven
or unsatisfactory,6 and that without the waiver, conducting the research would not
be feasible.' The waiver applies only where consent of the subject cannot be
obtained owing to the subject's medical condition, and the research intervention
must take place before consent can be obtained from a legally authorized
representative or family member! The researchers must have no reasonable way
of prospectively identifying likely subjects.' The regulations require that the
research intervention offer the prospect of direct benefit to the subject, and proof
of appropriate animal and other preclinical studies must be presented to the IRB
to support this potential benefit. Further, the risks must be reasonable in light of
"what is known about the medical condition of the potential class of subjects."
The research may include "randomized, placebo-controlled investigations.""
4. See infra Appendix for reprint of FDA regulations.
5. The FDA allowed a 45-day comment period on the proposed rule. Comments were received
from clinical investigators, Internal Review Boards, patient advocacy groups, trade associations,
professional societies, drug and medical device companies, and private citizens. These comments are
summarized at 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498-51,526 (1996).
6. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.24(a), (a)(1) (1999).
7. See id. § 50.24(a)(4).
8. See id. §§ 50.24(a)(2)(i)-(ii).
9. See id. § 50.24(a)(2)(iii).
10. Id, §§ 50.24(a)(3)(i)-(iii).
1. Id. § 50.24(a)(1).
1999)
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The investigator must commit to attempt to obtain consent from a legally
authorized representative or family member" during a specifically designated
therapeutic window. 3 The regulations require additional protections for the
potential subjects, including consultation with representatives of the community
from where the research is to be carried out'4 and public disclosure of the
clinical investigation both prior to the trial and after completion of the research,
which must include the demographic characteristics of the research population. "
The IRB must insure that the protocol includes procedures to inform the subject,
legal representative, or family member at the earliest opportunity that the subject
has been involved in the research, and the representative must be provided with
sufficiently detailed information and given the opportunity to discontinue the
subject's participation in the research.' This notice is required even if the subject
dies before a representative can be contacted. 7 The regulations also require an
independent data monitoring committee to oversee the investigation. Finally,
if the research qualifies for the waiver of informed consent, the protocol must be
submitted to the FDA through an investigational new drug application (IND) or
an investigational cdevice exemption, even if the drug or device has already been
approved for other indications."
B. Why Do We Need The Waiver
The FDA proposed the waiver in response to growing concern that the existing
rules "were making high quality acute care research activities difficult or
impossible to carry out at a time when the need for such research is increasingly
recognized."2 One purpose of the new rules was to harmonize a conflict
between the FDA and the DHHS rules.2' The DHHS guidelines approved
waivers of informed consent only when the proposed research posed minimal risk
to patients.' The effect of this "minimal risk" restriction was to exclude much
emergency resuscitation research, where the situation was often life-threatening
and the medical condition itself presented significant risk.' On the other hand,
the FDA rule allowed an exception from the general requirement of informed
consent if, in the investigator's opinion, "immediate use of the test article is...
12. See id. § 50.3(m) (defining a family member to include "any individual related by blood or
affinity whose close association with the subject is the equivalent of a family relationship").
13. See id. § 50.24(a)(5).
14. See id. § 50.24(v)(7)(i).
15. See id. § 50.24(i)(7)(iii).
16. See id. § 50.24(b).
17. See id.
18. See id. § 50.24(v)(7)(iv).
19. See id. § 50.24(6).
20. 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498 (1996) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 50.24).
21. See id.
22. See 45 C.F.R. § 116(d)(l) (1999).
23. See James G. Adams & Joel Wegener, Acting Without Asking: An Ethical Analysis of the Food
and Drug Administration Waiver of informed Consent for Emergency Research, 33 ANNALS EMERGENCY
MED. 218, 219-20 (1999).
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required to preserve the life of the subject. '2 4 This apparently precluded giving
either the standard treatment or a placebo in an emergency research protocol. If
the test article is required to preserve life, it would be unethical to withhold the
test article from an appropriate patient, thus eliminating the potential for a control
group.' The new waiver rule harmonized the FDA and DHHS rules in the
emergency context and clarified when a waiver of informed consent could be
issued for emergency research.'
During the comment period on the proposed rule, a number of presenters touted
the waiver as facilitating research in the emergency patient population, which
would "ultimately speed the wide availability" of tested and proven drugs and
devices to those in life-threatening situationsY' The new rule was applauded as
"a much needed step in the advancement of vital emergency research,. 2 "a major
step towards increasing the available therapies and medical care available for [the]
critically ill or injured,"' 9 and "a significant step forward towards advancing
medical care."3 One organization commented that it was "particularly pleased
with the balance . . . between the need for conducting high quality clinical
research in an effort to develop better treatments for critically ill patients and the
protection of human subjects."'" Another organization recognized that once the
waiver is implemented, it would "help to expedite study enrollments, thus
allowing for earlier study completion . . 32 For the most part, the proposed
waiver was lauded by physicians, clinical researchers and investigators, and
professional associations.
IlI. The Principle at Stake: Respect for Individual Autonomy
So why all the fuss? With the waiver of informed consent for emergency
research so widely hailed, and with so many critically ill patients now able to
receive the "opportunity" to participate in potentially life-saving "treatments,"
what is the downside? The primary objection to the waiver of informed consent
is that it fails to respect individual autonomy; thus, some discussion of the
evolution and development of this international human principle is necessary.
At the heart of the physician's Hippocratic Oath is that the physician must "do
no harm" to the patient.3 On its face, then, the Hippocratic Oath prohibits all
24. 21 C.F.R. § 50.23(b) (1999).
25. See Adams & Wegener, supra note 23, at 220.
26. See 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498, 51,501 (1996). The existing FDA and DHHS regulations were not
superseded by the waiver provision; these rules have been retained and are useful in situations not
covered by the new waiver. See id. at 51,503.
27. Id. at 51,498.
28. Id. (comment of the American College of Physicians and the Project on Informed Consent of
the University of Pennsylvania Center for Bioethics).
29. Id. (comment of the Brain Injury Association).
30. Id. (comment of the Coalition of Acute Resuscitation and Critical Care Researchers).
31. Id. (comment of the American Heart Association).
32. Id, (comment of the National Stroke Association).
33. Traditionally, doctors have taken the Hippocratic Oath as part of their medical school graduation
1999]
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research with human subjects designed to produce generalized knowledge.'
Clinical research is. undertaken for the benefit of society, and its focus is on the
production of knowledge that will be socially useful." That clinical experimen-
tation is contrary to the basic ethic of the Hippocratic Oath became painfully
evident when the world focused on the atrocities committed by the Nazi doctors
during World Wal" II, which culminated in the 1946 Nuremberg trials. At
Nuremberg, the world had two options; on the one hand, it could have embraced
the Hippocratic Oath, which would require strict physician-patient loyalty and
would have rendered experimentation for generalized knowledge unethical, or it
could embrace a new ethic that would allow patients to become "subjects" in
some morally allowable way." The world chose to allow human experimen-
tation, and the course chosen is reflected in the second principle of the Nurem-
berg Code: "[t]he experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society . . . ."" Full-blown utilitarianism was prevented, however, by
the first principle of the Nuremberg Code: "[t]he voluntary consent of the human
subject is absolutely essential."" Thus, the principle of autonomy, or self-
determination, was born.39 The research enterprise could proceed so long as the
autonomy of the individual was respected through his or her informed consent to
participate in the research.
The Nuremberg Code, however, did not address how autonomy was to be
respected when the potential subject was incapacitated or otherwise unable to
consent. This concern was addressed in the Declaration of Helsinki, adopted in
1962, which offers recommendations for conducting experiments using human
subjects.' The Declaration states that "[w]here physical or mental incapacity
makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, permission from the responsible
relative replaces that of the subject ....",,' Thus, the concept of surrogate
consent was born, allowing a departure from the Nuremberg Code proclamation
that consent of the subject is essential. Consent of the subject was no longer
essential after the adoption of the Declaration of Helsinki.
Despite the lofty aspirations expressed in the Nuremberg Code and the
Declaration of Helsinki, the period between 1946 and 1966 in the United States
was unregulated by the federal government, and in fact, reflected a virtual
ignorance, and sometimes even blatant disregard, for these emerging principles.
ceremony. The tenet, "First, do no harm," is generally attributed to Hippocrates. See HIPPOCRATES,
EPIDEMICS, bk. 1, § X1, at 625 (W.H.S, Jones trans., Harvard University Press 1948).
34. See Robert M. Veach, From Nuremberg Through the 1990': The Priority of Autonomy, in
ETHics OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 45.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 46.
37. Id.; see also ET ICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 431.
38. Veach, supra nose 34, at 46.
39. See id.
40. See WORLD MEDICAL ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI (1964) (rev. 1975, 1983, 1989),
reprinted in ETHICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, app. B at 433.
41. Id. at 465.
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A highly controversial article by Henry K. Beecher, M.D., provided twenty-two
examples of unethical research conducted between 1948 and 1965 by well-known
investigators at leading medical schools and government institutions who
published their results in leading medical journals, yet often risked the health or
life of their subjects without their knowledge or consent' Largely because of
the controversy generated by the Beecher article, the FDA and the National
Institute of Health (NIH) developed internal guidelines that were codified as
federal regulations in 1974.43 Also in that year, the newly formed National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical Research and
Behavioral Research (National Commission) was established and directed to
identify basic ethical principles underlying the conduct of biomedical research
involving human subjects and to develop federal guidelines." Of the seventeen
reports generated by the National Commission, the best remembered is the
Belmont Report, which identifies three fundamental principles to be respected in
experimentation on human subjects: respect for persons; beneficence; and
justice.45 After the Belmont Report, federal regulations were revised to reflect
officially sanctioned ethical principles set forth as guides for the resolution of
ethical problems.'
The first ethical principle of the Belmont Report, "Respect for Persons,"
requires not only respect for individual autonomy but protections for those with
diminished autonomy as well.47 Recognizing that some individuals lose the
capacity for self-determination due to their illness, the principle of respect for
persons requires additional protections for those persons unable to consent.4' The
second principle of the Belmont Report, "Beneficence," embodies the obligation
to maximize benefits and minimize harm to the subject.49 The third principle,
"Justice," requires fairness in the selection of research subjects and fair
distribution of the benefits and burdens of the research5 Thus, when informed
consent of the subject cannot be obtained, but the principles of justice and
beneficence dictate that the person must have the opportunity to participate in the
research, the focus is on the additional protections that are provided and on
whether these additional protections are sufficient to protect individual autonomy.
42. See Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1354 (1966); see
also ETHICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 9.
43. See ETHICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 10.
44. See William J. Winslade & Todd L. Krause, The Nuremberg Code Turns Fifty, in ETHICS CODES
IN MEDICINE 150 (Ulrich Trohler & Stella Reiter-Theil eds., 1996).
45. See id. at 151; NATIONAL COMM'N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
& BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (DHEW Publication No. (OS) 78-0012, Apr. 18, 1978)
[hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], reprinted in ETHICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, app. C at 437.
46. See ETHICS OF RESEARCH, supra note 2, at 10.
47. BELMONT REPORT, supra note 45, at 439.
48. See id. at 440.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 441-42.
1999]
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The issue, then, is whether the waiver of informed consent for emergency
research provides additional protections sufficient to protect individual autonomy.
If not, the waiver is unethical and must not be allowed.
One scholar, Baruch A. Brody, sees the waiver of informed consent for
emergency research as a successful balancing of the multiple values surrounding
the research effort.' These values include the desperate social need for research
to test promising treatments for patients in an emergency setting presenting acute
crises such as strokes and closed head injuries and the potential for direct benefit
to those patients in the treatment group, if the new treatment in fact proves
beneficial.' These values must, however, be weighed against the need to protect
individuals from the exploitation and harm by researchers in the event the new
therapies turn out to be harmful, and respect for individual autonomy, which
includes the right of persons not to be used for research without their consent or
the consent of tho;e who speak for them. 3
While ideally all of these values can be respected in a normal setting, this may
not be possible in the emergency setting where the subject is incapacitated and
the time within which one can obtain consent is limited.' Even when a patient
is conscious and her consent can be obtained, conditions such as time pressure
and emotional trauma raise questions as to whether consent truly can be
voluntary."5
Brody asserts that even when individual autonomy cannot be respected because
consent cannot be obtained, the research can still be conducted ethically, as long
as the other three values (great social need, potential of direct benefit to subjects,
and protection of individuals from exploitation and harm) are sufficiently
present.' In Brody's opinion, the FDA rules go far in ensuring that this is the
case. The first value of social need is sufficiently present, he explains, because
the FDA regulations allow a waiver to be issued only when the situation is life-
threatening, available treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory, and the research
is necessary to determine the safety and effectiveness of the particular interven-
tion." Moreover, the second value, potential benefit to the patients in the
treatment, is promoted by the FDA requirement that animal and other preclinical
studies support the potential for direct benefit to the patient." The third value,
protection of the patient-subject from harm and exploitation, is addressed through
the community consultation provision," supervision of research by the indepen-
51. See Baruch A. Brody, In Case of Emergency: No Need for Consent, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Jan-Feb 1997, at 7.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 8; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(1) (1999).
58. See Brody, supra note 51, at 8.
59. See id.; see atv., 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(7)(i).
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dent data and safety monitoring board,' and the requirement for FDA approval
even when the drug being tested is already approved for other uses."
IV. Criticisms and Concerns Generated by the Waiver
The principal concern of bioethicists does not seem to be that a waiver could
be granted at all; rather, the concern is that the waiver should be accompanied by
protections sufficient to compensate for not obtaining the subject's informed
consent. Following is an analysis of the primary concerns generated by the
waiver.
A. The Waiver Blurs the Distinction Between Therapy and Research
As a practical matter, the doctrine of informed consent imposes similar
disclosure and consent obligations for therapy and for research. For research,
however, the informed consent process also is subject to review by IRBs." Jay
Katz, a leader in the field of bioethics, notes, however, that in therapeutic
encounters, unlike research encounters, the physician's sole concern should be the
welfare of the patient.' This basic expectation is what gives physicians the
discretion and authority to make decisions on behalf of their patients.' In
clinical research, however, patient-subjects are used for scientific ends. In the
research setting, the investigators do not view the participants as patients, but as
subjects to be objectified in pursuit of answers to the research question."
Patients must understand that they are being asked to advance the interests of
medical science, rather than receiving the most advanced treatment available.'A
Whenever clear distinctions are not made between research and treatment, the
waiver becomes problematic because some people are being recruited to serve the
ends of others.67 Katz accuses the FDA of misleading the public by blurring the
distinction between research and treatment." The FDA's position is that research
under the waiver is appropriate only if "evidence support[s] the potential of
providing direct benefit to the individual subjects."' 9 Thus, the FDA's charac-
terization of the type of research conducted under the waiver implies that patients
60. See Brody, supra note 51, at 8; see also 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(7)(iv).
61. See Brody, supra note 51, at 8.
62. See Katz, Human Experimentation, supra note 1, at 13-14.
63. See id. at 14.
64. Katz notes, however, that even this basic presumption is questionable, given medical advances
that offer patients choices that, because they can decisively impact their quality of life, require very
subjective patient decisions. Moreover, because today a patient's available options may impact the
physician economically, a physician's self-interest could readily influence his recommendations to his
patient. See id. at 17.
65. See iUt at 15-16.
66. See Jay Katz, Blurring the Lines: Research, Therapy and the IRBs, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan-
Feb. 1997, at 9 [hereinafter Katz, Blurring the Lines]; see also Katz, Human Experimentation, supra note
1, at 9-54.
67. See id.
68. See Katz, Blurring the Lines, supra note 66, at 9.
69. Id. (quoting FDA comments at 61 Fed. Reg. 51,499 (1996)).
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
could expect to re*ceive beneficial treatment; in fact, argues Katz, this is not the
case, and the implication is unethical.'" Moreover, seriously ill patients are likely
to be confused about the purpose of the research, and may not view the risks and
benefits realistically.
7
'
On the other hand, one could say that within the physician-patient therapeutic
relationship, several exceptions to the informed consent principle are already
recognized, and recognizing a waiver of informed consent for emergency research
is not a significant additional step. One commentator, Norman Fost, explains that
informed consent is not an absolute principle, and in fact, it has been altered in
several ways generally considered ethical.
For example, virtually all states allow for surrogate or proxy consent under
certain circumstances, based on the principle of substituted judgment, which
ideally reflects what a patient would have wanted.. Furthermore, the principle
of implied consent operates when a patient allows her doctor to conduct low risk,
routine blood chemistries, x-rays, or urinalyses without being provided with the
details of the testing process.74 Another principle acknowledges the right of a
patient to choose not to be informed of her condition and to allow her physician
to act in her best interests." Even the informed consent of our military personnel
may be waived for "military expediency," under certain conditions which, in the
government's opinion, affect our national security or war interests.6
Virtually all jurisdictions recognize that a patient in an emergency condition
who is unconscious or otherwise unable to consent to treatment is presumed to
consent to treatment based on a reasonable person standard." The principle of
presumed consent is based on the presumption that a reasonable person would
consent to treatment based on the best judgment of the treating physician." Such
70. See kld at 9.
71. See Richard S. Saver, Critical Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REv. 205
(1996).
72. See Norman Fcst, Waived Consent For Emergency Research, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 163, 163-64
(1998). On the other hand, consent alone, even if informed, is not necessarily sufficient. See id, at 163.
After all, no one would argue that experimentation by the Nazi doctors during World War 1I would have
been permissible had they obtained the consent of their subjects. See id.
73. See id. at 173.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 174.
76. See Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (affirming the district court's refusal
to enjoin the Department of Defense from using an unapproved drugs on Operation Desert Storm troops
without their consent); :'ee also George J. Annas, Protecting Soldiers from Friendly Fire: The Consent
Requirement for Using !nvestigational Drugs and Vaccines in Combat, 24 AM. J. L. & MED. 245, 245
(1998).
77. For example, under Texas law, informed consent is implied as a matter of law if a patient is
unconscious or otherwise unable to give consent and immediate surgery or other medical care or
procedure is necessary to preserve the patient's life or health. See Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons
Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1968).
78. See Fost, supra note 72, at 174.
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a standard embodies the recognition that some persons would in fact not consent,
yet those persons would be treated anyway."
Even when informed consent is obtained from a patient, it often can be
described as an "elaborate ritual" since many fully competent patients do not truly
understand in any meaningful sense the risks and benefits of alternative
treatments."0 Often, the informed consent process provides, at best, physician
protection against malpractice claims, but one should not mistake this process for
truly informed consent."' The consent problem is heightened in the emergency
research situation where the risks are substantial and serious. Fost's point, then,
seems to be that the lines between treatment and research really are "blurred,"
and the basic principles supporting alterations of the informed consent doctrine
in the therapeutic relationship are rightfully extended to the research forum.
B, The Standard for Consent Should Be Higher in Research Studies - Not
Waived
Of general agreement is the principle that standards for consent should be
higher in the research setting. One reason is that, because the risks are not known
in advance (as, for example, with approved drugs), only the patient can decide to
assume them, and deferral to the physician is not appropriate.' Moreover, the
research subject cannot be presumed to consent to research that may not
necessarily benefit her." In addition, the researcher and the subject have
conflicting interests - the subject for her own well-being and the researcher
(even the kindly researcher) for the well-being of future patients who may benefit
from the research."
Arguably, this heightened standard for research is met by the FDA waiver and
its accompanying layers of protection for subjects in clinical trials. One compel-
ling viewpoint is that the waiver provides more protection for the critical care
subject than a patient receiving "innovative therapy" in the routine care setting."
While under routine care, in certain circumstances, a physician is at liberty to
experiment on her patients.' Under the principle of presumed consent, a patient
is presumed to consent to treatment judged appropriate by her physician. This
treatment, however, may take the form of an "innovative therapy" - use of a
drug that is unreviewed and uncontrolled, whose efficacy is unknown, and that
may be harmful to patients."7 The difference between innovative therapy and
79. See id.
80. Id. (quoting F.J. Ingelfinger, Informed "but Uneducated" Consent, 287 NEWv ENG. J. MED. 465
(1972)).
81. See Fost, supra note 72, at 175.
82. See Richard Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human EAperimentation: Bridging
the Gap Between Etldcal Tlwught and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REV. 67, 68-69, 88-90 (1986); see
aLo Saver, supra note 71, at 271 n.65.
83. See id,
84. See id. at 91, 97-98.
85. See Fost, supra note 72, at 175.
86. See id.
87. See Fost, supra note 72, at 176 ("Many invasive, dangerous interventions were used for decades
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research is that the physician is not constrained by regulatory oversight and there
is little likelihood that useful knowledge will be obtained for application to future
patients." One commentator remarked: "[als long as you promise not to learn
anything from what you're doing, you don't have to go through an IRB.""
Moreover, the chance of receiving "innovative therapy" is probably greater in the
emergency and critical care setting." Even when the patient's fully informed
consent to receive innovative therapy is obtained, consent alone does not
necessarily protect the patient given the conditions of trauma, confusion, and pain
a patient often experiences upon arrival at the emergency room. Thus, in this
sense, the clinical trial conducted under the FDA waiver, with its requirements for
attempting to obtain surrogate consent, along with its community consultation and
public disclosure provisions, protects the emergency research subject better than
a patient receiving the same treatment under the guise of "innovative therapy.""
C. Patients Would Not Want to Enter into a Research Study Without Con-
sent92
The basis for the emergency waiver is that consent may be implied because, in
emergency circumstances, a reasonable person would agree to experimental
therapy." But when the "therapy" is not necessarily therapy at all, but rather an
experimental intervention, patient preferences are not so easily implied."
Attempting to justify critical care research because, in the physician's judgment,
the patient may benefit equally from either the standard treatment or the ex-
perimental intervention greatly diminishes the principle of patient autonomy."
Nevertheless, some evidence indicates that, in fact, patients in life-threatening
emergencies would consent to participation in a research study if they could. In
1990, 558 patients were entered into a randomized, placebo controlled trial of
calcium channel-blockers given to comatose survivors of cardiac arrest.
Treatment had to occur within thirty minutes of restoring spontaneous circulation,
thus precluding prospective consent in virtually all cases. 7 Within eight hours,
and prior to administering a second dose of medication (or placebo), physicians
contacted family members to give full information and to obtain consent to
continued participation in the trial." This deferred consent method was used with
95% of the patient. Detailed reports of these interactions were examined, and
before physicians realized the procedures were unaccceptably toxic, ineffective, or both.").
88. See id.
89. Fost, supra note 72, at 176 (quoting from a personal conversation with Paul Lietman).
90. See id.
91. See id, at 177.
92. See id, at 175.
93. See Saver, supra note 71, at 231.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 232.
96. See id.; see al.so Norman S. Abramson & Peter Safer, Deferred Coavent: Use in Clinical
Resuscitation Research, 19 ANNALs EMERGENCY MED. 781, 782 (1990).
97. See id.
98. See Post, supra note 72, at 178.
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results showed that in only twelve instances did families refuse to consent to the
patient's continued participation." In all twelve cases, however, the families
believed that it would be better to allow the patient to die because of the severity
of the underlying medical condition - not because they did not wish the patient
to participate in the experiment." In only six cases did families react negatively
because the experiment proceeded initially without consent, but in three of these
cases, the concerns were related to the patient's survival with the underlying
medical condition - not the patient's participation in the experiment per se."0'
Thus, at least in this case, enrolling patients in a randomized clinical trial which
gave patients the opportunity to receive a promising experimental treatment, even
though some would receive a placebo, was consistent with the families'
"understanding of what the patient would have wanted.""Ita
D. Use of a Placebo in Research Conducted Under a Waiver Is Unethical
Research conducted under the waiver of informed consent may, under certain
circumstances, include a placebo."'3 Objections to placebo use are based on the
principle that giving a placebo without consent is unethical because it offers no
conceivable benefit to the patient." Even recognizing the potential for a
"placebo effect" - although this is unlikely given the trauma of the patient at the
time the placebo is administered - the purpose of a placebo is not to treat the
patient. Rather, a placebo is a non-treatment."
The FDA, in comment, explains "[i]n virtually all cases, when a placebo is
used, standard care, if any, would be given to all subjects, with subjects ran-
domized to receive, in addition, the test treatment or a placebo.""' But why not
in all cases? Jay Katz, an outspoken critic of the waiver (placebo) provision,
states the answer is simply that the FDA and the research community place a
higher value on research which uses the recognized "gold standard" of scientific
research, the randomized placebo-controlled trial."'7 Katz bases his opinion on
the FDA comment: "[t]he agency believes that it is important to recognize in the
regulation that placebo-controlled trials may be conducted under this emergency
research provision; thus it is retaining the wording of this section." '"'
Katz believes that "if one cuts through the rhetoric, some human beings may
be sacrificed for the advancement of science so that future but not present
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 178.
102. Id. at 179.
103. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (1999).
104. See Fost, supra note 72, at 179.
105. See id.
106. Katz, Blurring the Lines, supra note 66, at 10 (discussing 61 Fed. Reg. 51,509 (1996))
(emphasis added).
107. See id. at 11.
108. Id. at 10-11; see also 61 Fed. Reg. 51,509 (stating that the FDA anticipates that a placebo-
controlled trial would be used only when needed to determine whether the standard treatment is in fact
useful).
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patients (as well as medical device companies, pharmaceutical industries, and
investigators) will benefit from the research."" He proposes that when a waiver
is issued, researchers should forego the scientific certainty that they would have
gained through use of a placebo arm, when there is "any evidence that the [new]
therapy may be helpful.""' Katz is not alone in this viewpoint. Another
commentator, Barvch Brody, while recognizing the scientific value of placebo-
controlled emergency research, questions the appropriateness of allowing a
placebo arm in research conducted under a waiver,' In the life-threatening
conditions under which emergency research takes place, it is difficult to justify
a placebo arm, particularly when the regulations require evidence supporting the
potential of the new treatment for direct benefit to the patient in order to issue the
waiver." The FDA waiver allows use of a placebo where there is some
evidence that the new treatment is beneficial, but more evidence is needed."'
Overall, however, Brody welcomes the FDA regulations as "the triumph of
pluralistic casuistry over the absolutism of single values."".
On the other hand, just because a placebo is a non-treatment does not mean that
a placebo never benefits the patient."' If the trial is properly designed, the
investigator should be indifferent as to whether the active treatment or the placebo
will be more helpful or harmful to the patient."' One could argue that ad-
ministering a placebo is not inconsistent with the presumed consent recognized
by virtually all states when a patient is in an emergency medical condition and
unable to consent."7 Given the basic premise that a reasonable person would
more than likely consent to receiving a potentially beneficial experimental
treatment where the standard treatment is unproven or ineffective, then a
reasonable person would presumably consent to the 50% chance of receiving the
new treatment."' This is so because the patient would have Ito option that would
guarantee that she would receive the experimental drug, since the experimental
drug would not be available outside of the trial,"' What may be more difficult
to presume, however, is whether the patient would choose the standard treatment,
which. would be available outside the trial, over a 50% chance of receiving a
placebo. What may appear to be a case of whether the glass is half-full or half-
empty may be much more when presumptions are based on the very subjective
concerns of a patient in a life-threatening situation,
109. See Katz, Blur ring the Lines, supra note 66, at 11.
110. Id.
Ill. See Brody, supra note 51, at 8.
112. See id. at 8-9.
113. See id. at 9.
114. Id.
115. See Fost, supra note 72, at 179.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 180.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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E. The Waiver Will Disparately Impact Minority Communities
The waiver of informed consent for emergency research may disparately impact
African Americans, hispanics, and the poor. Many trauma centers where
emergency research likely will take place are located in urban inner cities and in
public hospitals in areas where minorities and impoverished citizens reside."
Public hospitals are often associated with universities and are sites for teaching
and medical research.' Studies have shown that minorities are dispropor-
tionately represented in hospital emergency rooms for treatment of life-threatening
firearms-related injuries and death and brain trauma, which make them likely
subjects for emergency research." In one year, of 52,000 United States
residents that died with traumatic brain injury, forty-four percent were caused by
firearms, the leading cause of trauma-associated death for black and hispanic
males." Thus, these minorities will be disproportionately conscripted into
medical experiments without their consent.
On the other hand, the principle of justice requires that societies' benefits and
burdens must be distributed fairly." Subjects may not be selected for research
on the basis of their economic or ethnic status, and if these classes are dispropor-
tionately selected or specifically targeted, it must be for a reason directly related
to the type of research conducted.'" Justice is the requirement to act fairly and
requires that research advances be available to all populations, including the
vulnerable."
At the time it was proposed, however, the waiver generated misunderstanding
as to how the justice principle would be respected in minority communities. In
the preamble notice to its proposed rulemaking, the FDA justified the waiver,
suggesting it would likely increase enrollment of minority and low-income
patients in critical care studies, noting that surrogate consent was more easily
obtained from white, middle, and upper class families than from poor
minorities. 7 At the time, some interpreted this comment to mean that if
surrogate consent were sought on behalf of minorities, it would be refused - and
the waiver would overcome this barrier." The FDA later explained its comment
had been misinterpreted' it meant that surrogate representatives of minority
patients were often harder to locate, and that without the waiver, equitable
120. See Annette Dula, Bearing the Brunt of the New Regulations: Minority Populations, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Jan-Feb 1997, at I I [hereinafter Dula, Bearing the Brunt].
121. See Id.
122. See id. at 11-12.; see also Daniel M. Sosin et al., Trends in Death Associated with Traumatic
Brain Injury, 1972 Through 1992, 273 JAMA 1778 (1995).
123. See Dula, Bearing the Brunt, supra note 120, at 12.
124. See BELMONT REPORT, supra note 45, at 442.
125. See id.
126. See Adams & Wegener, supra note 23, at 218.
127. See Protection of Human Subjects: Informed Consent, 60 Fed. Reg. 49,086,49,093 (1995); see
also Saver, supra note 71, at 253.
128. See Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent & Waiver of Informed Consent
Requirements, 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498, 51,500 (1996).
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numbers of minority patients may not have the opportunity to receive the potential
benefits of the emergency research." Thus, the waiver would allow the hoped-
for benefits from tie research to be more equitably distributed among minority
populations.
Minority populations, however, are suspicious of medical and scientific
research, and with significant justification. The most publicized example of the
egregious use of minorities without their consent is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,
a non-therapeutic, unconsented-to study of hundreds of black men with syphilis,
whose conditions were monitored for over twenty years."' These men were
never treated, despite the availability of penicillin.'3' Other documented
examples of disregard for the principle of informed consent include research on
slave women for firding a cure for urine leakage into the vagina and using black
women to perfect the cesarean section.' In the much-publicized Human
Radiation Experiments, where humans were used to study the effects of radiation,
research subjects were disproportionately members of minority populations.'
Giving minorities the opportunity to participate in emergency research while
at the same time respecting that their mistrust of the medical community may
inhibit their participation, provides a challenge to the research community. On the
one hand, progress may be made through the community consultation and public
disclosure requirements, provided the programs are specially tailored to the
potential population. On the other hand, in some cases, it may be that the correct
determination for the IRB reviewing the research is that some minority
communities ought to be excluded.
F. The Community -Consultation Provisions Are Inadequate
During the first year in which waivers were available for emergency research,
two studies were granted a waiver."' One was a large multicenter trial on the
use of an oxygen-carrying drug in hemorrhagic shock, the other was the test of
a device for the management of cardiac arrest. ' In addition, a waiver under the
new rules was granted to a study already in progress at the University of Texas
Health Science Center on the use of hypothermia in head trauma.3
In February 1999, the first investigational device study performed under the
new waiver published its experience with the regulation. This study was a
randomized protocol investigating the benefit of circumferential chest compression
provided by a pneumatically inflated "vest" compared with standard manual
cardio-pulmonary rescusitation (CPR).' Initially, IRB approval of the study
129. See id.
130. See generally JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1981).
131. See id. at 7-9.
132. See Annette Dula, African American Su-spicion of the Health Care System Is Justified: What
Do We Do About I?, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETniCS 347, 347-48 (1994).
133. See Dula, Bearing the Brunt, supra note 120, at 12.
134. See Charles Maiwick, Assessment of Exception to Informed Consent, 278 JAMA 1392 (1997).
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. See Mark S. Kremers et al., Initial Experience Using the Food and Drug Administration
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was deferred due to concern over insufficient community consultation protections
in the research protocol.'39 Moreover, the IRB and the hospital administration
and its legal representative expressed considerable reservation about the waiver,
specifically about potential malpractice liability.3 It was due primarily to
concerns over the adequacy of community consultation and the potential for
malpractice litigation that the approval process took longer than four months. '
Ultimately, the study was approved after the investigators added a public forum
to present the information and to address community concerns, and notification
of the study was posted on large signs in the participating hospital units.'4
Notices of the public forum, which included a telephone number and information
about the study, were published in the largest major daily newspaper serving the
community.'42 Additional means of public disclosure included brochures to
current hospital patients, display of posters on the walls of participating hospital
units, a video demonstration of Vest CPR played continuously in the doctor's
lounge, and other efforts. A total of twelve calls and twenty pre-registrations were
received. Of the twenty-five people attending the forum, fifteen (sixty percent)
worked in the health care field. 3 Thus, it may not be surprising that all forum
participants approved of the study, and no one expressed ethical concerns.
Ultimately, the study was discontinued after four months, due to cumulative costs
and slow enrollment." During this four-month period, the protocol was
performed on only four patients, and the investigators report that no patient
requested exemption from enrollment or expressed concerns about research
without consent.'45 The medical staff appeared equally at ease, and no physician
expressed major concerns about the ethics of the study."M In their article
reviewing their experience with the waiver, however, the investigators stressed
that the existing community consultation provisions were too broad and led to
confusion over what was required. 47
One year after the new regulation took effect, the FDA held a meeting to
discuss its progress.'49 One of the principal reasons for holding the meeting was
concern over the interpretation of community consultation requirements.' At
this meeting, a senior legal advisor to the FDA, Mary Pendergast, stated: "[w]e
have been disturbed by some of the methods of consultation presented .... We
Guidelines for Emergency Research Witluut Consent, 33 ANNALs EMERGENCY MED. 224, 225 (1999).
138. See id. The participating hospital was a 593-bed acute care private facility which drew patients
from the surrounding five counties.
139. See id. at 229.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 226.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 227.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Marwick, supra note 134, at 1393.
149. See id.
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can't help wondering if the [IRBs], sponsors, and researchers are taking the rule
seriously, when the only evidence we see of community consultation is an
advertisement in th newspaper.""'i
On the other hand, the investigators of the hypothermia study at the University
of Texas, in an effort to comply with the community consultation requirement,
moved to get Houston's mayor to declare a "Head Injury Day" to increase public
awareness of the potential for brain trauma.'5 ' In addition, the investigators used
an existing minorities outreach program at the university to spread information
about the study to various civic organizations, churches, health and education
centers, senior citizens' groups, the chamber of commerce, the local Mothers
Against Drunk Driving group, radio programs, and schools."'
Another criticism of the community consultation provision is that the
regulations provide no guidelines as to who are "representatives of the com-
munity" from which the subjects will be drawn, nor any explanation of how
"communities" are defined.'"
While some believe the requirement for community consultation is too
ambiguous and that the FDA should have been clearer about what it expected of
researchers, others believe the rules allow necessary flexibility." For example,
in a proposal involving cocaine addicts at high risk of death from acidosis,
potential subjects may be better informed about the study through contacts with
former drug addicts and welfare or parole officers than through newspapers or
television, and the current rules would allow for this flexible interpretation.'
At the meeting held one year after the new regulations took effect, the FDA's
Associate Commissioner for Health Affairs said the FDA would issue guidance
information for those involved in planning and conducting research involving
exceptions for consent." To date, however, no such guidelines exist,
G. The Waiver's Surrogate Consent Requirement May Conflict with State Law
The FDA regulations require that, where a waiver is issued, the investigator
must commit to attempting to contact (to the extent feasible in the short
therapeutic window) a legally authorized representative for the purpose of
obtaining consent fc.r the subject's participation in the clinical investigation."'
Many state statutes that allow a person to designate a durable power of attorney
for health care, however, would not extend the agent's authority to decisions about
the principal's participation in experimental research. For example, under Texas
law, a person may execute a durable power of attorney for health care that
designates an agent to "make any health care decision on the principal's behalf
150. Id.
151. See id. at 1393.
152. See id.
153, See Fost, supra note 72, at 181.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(5) (1999).
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that the principal could make if the principal were competent."'5 Prior to
amendment of the statutory definitions on September 1, 1999, a "health care
decision" was defined as a "treatment, service, or procedure to maintain, diagnose,
or treat an individual's physical or mental condition."'" Thus, the durable power
of attorney for health care did not include allowing a patient's agent to consent
to an experimental intervention. Nothing guarantees that a particular patient will
receive the new intervention, in light of the fact that the protocol may include a
placebo. In fact, the condition of those in the treatment arm may actually be
worsened."
In the absence of a health care directive, most states' laws designate a hierarchy
of individuals whom the patient's physician may contact to make treatment
decisions if the patient is incapacitated. For example, under the current Texas
statute, the attending physician and one person from a prioritized list, beginning
with the patient's spouse and moving to the patient's adult children, parents, or
nearest living relative, must agree to the treatment. 6' Still, however, the statute
refers to a "treatment decision," which would, under most statutory definitions,
not include experimental interventions - or at least certainly would not be
presumed to include participation in experimental protocols in the same manner
that an incapacitated patient may be presumed to want to receive standard
treatment. 6
In December 1998, a panel of experts, the Human Research Ethics Group,
members of the Project on Informed Consent at the University of Pennsylvania
Center for Bioethics, issued a report suggesting certain amendments to the federal
regulations governing experimentation on human subjects. The panel proposed
that state statutes allowing for durable powers of attorney for health care be
amended to allow surrogate consent for research that may potentially benefit
individual subjects, or that presented no more than a small increase over minimal
risk to the subject.' The panel reasoned that allowing patients to express their
wishes with respect to research participation promotes patient autonomy, as well
as allows a designated surrogate to act for the potential benefit of the patient
should the patient become incompetent.'" In addition to decisions about
participation in research, the panel suggested that a durable power of attorney or
other advance directive should allow the named surrogate to withdraw the subject
from the research, considering the subject's known preferences and the actual
benefit the subject continues to receive as the research continues."
158. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.152(a) (West Supp. 2000).
159. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 135.002 (West 1997) (repealed 1999) (definition of "health
care decision" omitted in recodification).
160. See Jonathan Moreno et al., Updating Protections for Human Subjects Involved in Research,
280 JAMA 1951 (1998).
161. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.039(b).
162. Id.
163. See Moreno, supra note 160, at 1952.
164. See id.
165. See iL
1999]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1999
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
H. Physicians and Drug and Device Companies Will Seek to Expand the
Waiver Concept to Non-Emergency Investigations
Some physicians believe that requiring different standards of informed consent
for standard care, innovative treatments, or research threatens the physician's
ability to advance the care of the critically ill." These physicians say such
requirements are not realistic."
Some physicians would use the rationale behind the waiver of informed consent
to support proposals that go far beyond the emergency life-threatening situation
and would extend the waiver to the physician's everyday practice.' One group
of physicians made such a proposal recently in an article they coauthored in the
New England Journal of Medicine."m These authors comment that what they
have described as "clinical and practical realities"'' " were recently recognized
and embodied in the waiver of informed consent for emergency research."' The
FDA and DHHS endorsed the waiver on the ground that it would allow the
seriously ill access to new therapies. This endorsement could be of benefit to
future patients.'" The authors further postulate that this rationale should extend
to a physician who, for example, wishes to conduct a randomized controlled trial
to determine which of two antibiotics is more effective at treating bronchitis.'
In addition; the authors recognize the paradox that allows a physician under a
general consent for treatment to try a novel, unproven treatment on his patient
that she may only have read about recently. But if the same physician wanted to
determine which of two widely used drugs was better at treating a particular
condition, she must prepare a formal protocol, obtain IRB approval, and seek
written informed consent from potential subjects. In their analysis, the authors
distinguish between the general consent to treatment a patient gives as part of the
physician-patient relationship, which includes standard medications and routine
tests, and the specific informed consent necessary whenever the proposed
intervention involves more risk as compared to the benefit, or when patient
preferences or values are expected to influence the decision." The authors
propose that if an intervention could be offered outside a trial without the patient's
informed consent, then the physician ought to be able to include the patient in a
controlled trial without consent provided some additional protections exist."
166. See Ronald B. Hirschl & Robert Bartlett, Ethics of Proxy Consent for Research Involving
Patients With Adult Respratory Distress Syndrome, 276 JAMA 949 (1996).
167. See id.
168. See Robert Truog et al., Is Informed Consent Always Necessary for Randomized, Controlled
Trials, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 804 (1999).
169. See id.
170. Id. at 806.
171. See id.
172. See 61 Fed. Reg. 51,498-51,533 (1996).
173. See Truog, supra note 168, at 804.
174. See id.
175. See ao. at 805.
176. See id.
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These protections, the authors explain, would include requiring no more than
minimal additional risk in comparison with alternatives, that the investigator
should have honest uncertainty about which treatment is better (clinical
equipoise), and an assurance that no reasonable person should have a preference
for one treatment over another." The authors recognize, however, that some
communities, such as racial minorities who may be particularly sensitive to being
part of an experiment based on a history of abuse (rather than for any reason
related to the study), may require specific informed consent.17 Finally, the
authors propose that patients should be informed that the setting in which they are
being treated uses the standards described in determining the need for specific,
instead of general, informed consent, thus allowing patients to seek additional
information or go elsewhere for care." The authors claim that if a clinical
treatment meets the proposed standards, informed consent is unnecessary because
patients are unlikely to prefer one medication over another, and it is unlikely that
the process of obtaining specific consent would serve the patient in any
meaningful way." If this is so, what is the harm in providing the information
and, out of respect for the patient, allowing the patient to decide? It seems more
likely that the authors fear that informing the patient merely would allow patients
to opt out for subjective reasons unconnected to the study and that medicine
cannot advance at the proper speed if patients are involved in this way. This
attitude is patronizing and disturbing. The authors recognize that their controver-
sial position would have little support among ethicists. '
L Other Ambiguities
At least four other ambiguities arise with respect to the waiver.
(1) A waiver may be issued so long as the research "could not practicably be
carried out without the waiver."" The question that arises is how narrow must
the treatment window be in order for it to be impractical for the researcher to
obtain surrogate consent. The rules require that surrogate consent be obtained
whenever possible, even when the waiver has been issued." Researchers have
expressed their concern over this requirement; they want to know how many
telephone calls constitute an adequate effort to obtain surrogate consent and what
else is expected."
(2) Although the FDA regulations are restricted to situations where available
treatments are unproven or unsatisfactory,' it is not clear whether "unproven"
means not proved by rigorous scientific evidence, or whether it merely means
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 804.
181. See id.
182. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(4) (1999).
183. See id. § 50.24(a)(5)-(a)(6); see also Brody, supra note 51, at 8.
184. See Marwick, supra note 148, at 1393.
185. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.21(a)(1) (1999).
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unproven in the clinical judgment of physicians who have observed therapeutic
benefits." Similarly, the question arises whether the available treatment is
"unsatisfactory". unless it improves the patient's condition by 100%, or whether
it is "unsatisfactory" if the patient's condition improved by only 50%."' Clearer
guidelines and definitions could eliminate subjective differences.
(3) The waiver rquires that the patient or her family members be informed as
soon as is feasible, and that the patient or family may "discontinue the subject's
participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject
is otherwise entitled...... What the rules do not address, however, is what
becomes of the subject's data if the family opts not to continue in the trial."'
Exclusion of the subject's data could affect the validity of the trial results,
particularly when r patient dies.'"
(4) The waiver of informed consent requirement for emergency research applies
only to subjects in a "life-threatening situation.". For patients with acute brain
injury, however, the fear of surviving only to be left with permanent, severe brain
disability, may in fact be greater than the fear of death." Although the patient
technically may net have a "life-threatening" condition, the rules were clearly
meant to include those with acute brain injury as well. The rules should be
limited to "serious conditions in which irreversible damage could occur.'...
V. Recommendations
A. Establish a National Human Investigation Board
The morality and legality of human research ought to be subjected to intensive
public scrutiny and congressional mandate.'" For decades, Jay Katz has
advocated the need for a National Human Investigation Board. 5 The need for
a national body is especially critical given the responsibility that the federal
regulations vest in IRBs. Katz argues that the IRBs are not able to make the
ethical judgments required of them given their time limitations, the composition
of the boards, and the pressure for approval from peers at their own
institution." Under the current system, many IRB members are on the faculty
of the institutions to which the investigators belong; thus, IRB members face an
inherent conflict of interest when called upon to protect research subjects when
186. See Katz, Blurting the Lines, supra note 66, at 9.
187. Id. at 10.
188. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(b) (1999).
189. See Fost, supra note 72, at 181.
190. See id.
191. 21 C.F.R. § 50.24(a)(1) (1999).
192. See Fost, supra note 72, at 182 ("Death is the most irreversible of harms, but it is not the only
one; and for many patients it is not the one most feared . ..
193. Id.
194. See Katz, Hunui Experimentation, supra note 1, at 39.
195. See JAY KArL, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN BEINGS 856-954 (1972).
196. See Kaiz, Blurring the Lines, supra note 66, at 12.
[Vol. 52:565
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol52/iss4/3
MEDICAL RESEARCH & PATIENT AUTONOMY
to do so could impede the research and affect their colleagues in decisive
ways.'97 The primary responsibility of the National Human Investigation Board
would be to formulate clear, detailed research policies and to serve as a resource
to which IRBs can turn for guidance and advice.'" The Board, Katz proposes,
would establish review procedures that would allow for publication of Board
decisions which would be a step toward case-by-case development of policies
governing human experimentation.'"
B. Amend the Current Regulations
Under the current regulations, a waiver may be issued for research that could
not practically be carried out without the waiver." That provision should be
amended to require investigators to give specific assurance that a study cannot be
conducted without using subjects who are unconscious or otherwise in-
capacitated."' A waiver should not be granted in those cases where the research
could go forward using subjects capable of consenting in advance. This
recommendation would eliminate the cases where use of the waiver would allow
research to proceed faster; the research would still proceed, but at a slower pace.
For example, a waiver may be necessary in cases of traumatic brain injury
resulting from a motor vehicle crash; on the other hand, repeat myocardial
infarction may lend itself to recruitment through advance consent."
Perhaps the most compelling recommendation for safeguarding the interests of
the incapacitated subject is the appointment of an independent physician to assess
continued participation of the subject if no surrogate consent could be obtained
within reasonable time. For example, if surrogate consent could not be obtained
within twelve hours, the protocol would require that a physician unconnected to
the research evaluate the risks and benefits of allowing the patient to continue in
the research. Such an amendment would provide incentive to the study team to
locate a relative in order to avoid involving another physician.2"
The regulations further should be amended to clarify that "life-threatening"
situations include "brain-threatening" emergencies as well. The waiver should
include serious conditions in which irreversible brain damage could occur.
Finally, no waiver should be issued in investigations with a placebo arm."
C. Amend State Laws
State statutes that currently limit the authority of an agent acting under a
durable power of attorney for health care to "treatment" decisions, should be
amended. These statutes should allow agents and other surrogate decision makers
197. See Katz, Human Experimentation, supra note I, at 41.
198. See id. at 39.
199. See id. at 40.
200. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.24 (1999).
201. See Moreno, supra note 160, at 1952.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 1953.
204. See supra Part IV.D.
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to decide whether to allow a subject's participation in an experimental protocol.
In addition, the authority of agents and surrogates should be extended to allow an
agent to withdraw a subject from the research when it is in the subject's best
interest.
VI. Conclusion
The doctrine of informed consent is at the heart of respect for individual
autonomy, and ethical research requires obtaining the informed consent of the
subjects who participate. But many potentially life-saving interventions can be
studied and tested only under emergency conditions, when the patient-subject is
incapacitated and unable to consent to participate in the study. Often, the test
drugs must be given, or other interventions must occur, within a window of time
too brief to locate family or others who consent on behalf of the patient. The
medical and legal communities must, however, remain vigilant so that medicine
is not advanced through an ambiguous waiver of informed consent that is
subjectively interpreted or that is disproportionately applied to minorities.
Additional regulatory guidelines are needed, and are already too long in coming.
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APPENDIX
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS TITLE 21 -
FOOD AND DRUGS CHAPTER 1 -
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
SUBCHAPTER A - GENERAL PART 50 - PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS SUBPART B - INFORMED CONSENT OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
§ 50.24 Exception from informed consent requirements for emergency research.
(a) The IRB responsible for the review, approval, and continuing review of the
clinical investigation described in this section may approve that investigation
without requiring that informed consent of all research subjects be obtained if the
IRB (with the concurrence of a licensed physician who is a member of or
consultant to the IRB and who is not otherwise participating in the clinical
investigation) finds and documents each of the following:
(1) The human subjects are in a life-threatening situation, available treatments
are unproven or unsatisfactory, and the collection of valid scientific evidence,
which may include evidence obtained through randomized placebo-controlled
investigations, is necessary to determine the safety and effectiveness of particular
interventions.
(2) Obtaining informed consent is not feasible because:
(i) The subjects will not be able to give their informed consent as a result of
their medical condition;
(ii) The intervention under investigation must be administered before consent
from the subjects' legally authorized representatives is feasible; and
(iii) There is no reasonable way to identify prospectively the individuals likely
to become eligible for participation in the clinical investigation.
(3) Participation in the research holds out the prospect of direct benefit to the
subjects because:
(i) Subjects are facing a life-threatening situation that necessitates intervention;
(ii) Appropriate animal and other preclinical studies have been conducted, and
the information derived from those studies and related evidence support the
potential for the intervention to provide a direct benefit to the individual subjects;
and
(iii) Risks associated with the investigation are reasonable in relation to what
is known about the medical condition of the potential class of subjects, the risks
and benefits of standard therapy, if any, and what is known about the risks and
benefits of the proposed intervention or activity.
(4) The clinical investigation could not practicably be carried out without the
waiver.
(5) The proposed investigational plan defines the length of the potential
therapeutic window based on scientific evidence, and the investigator has
committed to attempting to contact a legally authorized representative for each
1999]
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subject within that window of time and, if feasible, to asking the legally
authorized representative contacted for consent within that window rather than
proceeding without consent. The investigator will summarize efforts made to
contact legally authorized representatives and make this information available to
the IRB at the time of continuing review.
(6) The IRB has reviewed and approved informed consent procedures and an
informed consent document consistent with § 50.25. These procedures and the
informed consent document are to be used with subjects or their legally
authorized representatives in situations where use of such procedures and
documents is feasible. The IRB has reviewed and approved procedures and
information to be used when providing an opportunity for a family member to
object to a subject's participation in the clinical investigation consistent with
paragraph (a)(7)(v) of this section.
(7) Additional protections of the rights and welfare of the subjects will be
provided, including, at least:
(i) Consultation (including, where appropriate, consultation carried out by the
IRB) with representatives of the communities in which the clinical investigation
will be conducted and from which the subjects will be drawn;
(ii) Public disclosure to the communities in which the clinical investigation will
be conducted and from which the subjects will be drawn, prior to initiation of the
clinical investigation, of plans for the investigation and its risks and expected
benefits;
(iii) Public disclosure of sufficient information following completion of the
clinical investigation to apprise the community and researchers of the study,
including the demographic characteristics of the research population, and its
results;
(iv) Establishment of an independent data monitoring committee to exercise
oversight of the clinical investigation; and
(v) If obtaining informed consent is not feasible and a legally authorized
representative is not reasonably available, the investigator has committed, if
feasible, to attempting to contact within the therapeutic window the subject's
family member who is not a legally authorized representative, and asking whether
he or she objects to the subject's participation in the clinical investigation. The
investigator will summarize efforts made to contact family members and make
this information available to the IRB at the time of continuing review.
(b) The IRB is responsible for ensuring that procedures are in place to inform,
at the earliest feasible opportunity, each subject, or if the subject remains
incapacitated, a legally authorized representative of the subject, or if such a
representative is not reasonably available, a family member, of the subject's
inclusion in the clinical investigation, the details of the investigation and other
information contained in the informed consent document. The IRB shall also
ensure that there is a procedure to inform the subject, or if the subject remains
incapacitated, a legally authorized representative of the subject, or if such a
representative is not reasonably available, a family member, that he or she may
discontinue the subject's participation at any time without penalty or loss of
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benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled. If a legally authorized
representative or family member is told about the clinical investigation and the
subject's condition improves, the subject is also to be informed as soon as
feasible. If a subject is entered into a clinical investigation with waived consent
and the subject dies before a legally authorized representative or family member
can be contacted, information about the clinical investigation is to be proved to
the subject's legally authorized representative or family member, if feasible.
(c) The IRB determinations required by paragraph (a) of this section and the
documentation required by paragraph (e) of this section are to be retained by the
IRB for at least 3 years after completion of the clinical investigation, and the
records shall be accessible for inspection and copying by FDA in accordance with
§ 56.115(b) of this chapter.
(d) Protocols involving an exception to the informed consent requirement under
this section must be performed under a separate investigational new drug
application (IND) or investigational device exemption (IDE) that clearly identifies
such protocols as protocols that may include subjects who are unable to consent.
The submission of those protocols in a separate IND/IDE is required even if an
IND for the same drug product or an IDE for the same device already exists.
Applications for investigations under this section may not be submitted as
amendments under §§ 312.30 or 812.35 of this chapter.
(e) If an IRB determines that it cannot approve a clinical investigation because
the investigation does not meet the criteria in the exception provided under
paragraph (a) of this section or because of other relevant ethical concerns, the
IRB must document its findings and provide these findings promptly in writing
to the clinical investigator and to the sponsor of the clinical investigation. The
sponsor of the clinical investigation must promptly disclose this information to
FDA and to the sponsor's clinical investigators who are participating or are asked
to participate in this or a substantially equivalent clinical investigation of the
sponsor, and to other IRB's that have been, or are, asked to review this or a
substantially equivalent investigation by that sponsor.
[61 FR 51528, Oct. 2, 1996]
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